et al.: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEW
LOYALTIES by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. San Diego: Harcourt

Brace J ovanich (1984). Pp. 96.
This latest book from Daniel Patrick Moynihan (the Senior
United States Senator for the State of New York) is written in an
informal, conversational style. As in a conversation, it is clear that
the book reflects the author's subjective associations of ideas as
much as any logical, temporal or sequential structure. This book
was clearly not written in what one might call the academic or
mandarin style, the style in which one usually casts the important
topics he discusses. Rather, it is written with a deceptive simplicity
and a personal approach and manages to present felicitously the
author's own views. Of course, if Aristotle was, as Bertrand Russell
has told us, the "first professor," his teacher, Plato, was the first
(academic) writer to present fundamental questions in a conversational mode. Since most writers on today's basic issues in international relations are professors, we have become more used, than
perhaps we should, to the Aristotelean style of presentation,
especially in the context of the esoteric science of international
"crisis management," than the Platonic or colloquial mode. In
exposing one's thoughts to a wider public than the professoriat, it
is, perhaps, important for an author to follow a more colloquial form;
and Plato, through his Socrates, is still an unrivalled model even
though much of Socrates' discourse seems more like thinking aloud
than a presentation of an exhaustive analysis.
I.

THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

The dust jacket tells us that in this book the author addresses
three basic issues of the modern world: international peace, racism,
and international law. The first topic might have been better
described as a journey with the Senator in his pilgrimage of
understanding as to what the nuclear arms race means to him. He
does not comprehensively take up the wider issue of world peacefor example, organizing for a peaceful world, including the necessary
political, social and economic agendas. Nor is the agenda of peacekeeping studied. What Senator Moynihan does is to specifically and
critically review America's emerging and changing values regarding
foreign policy where it connects with defense policy, especially those
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values which underlie America's policy of nuclear deterrence
("second strike capability"). He is troubled by his perception of
recent basic changes in our nuclear defense policy. In this context
he recounts the interaction of his thoughts as they subjectively
evolved, with his experience of senatorial politics regarding the MX
problem. Indeed, this key issue provides the focus of the second
chapter of the book. He presents his argument in favor of his vote
in the Senate against funding the White House's plans to build the
MX missile ("too large to conceal and too 'valuable' not to be
targeted," p. 7), and cogently explains his disquiet, since he is persuaded that the MX missile represents a shift from "deterrence."
Starting from the premise of "crisis stability" ("the utterly
essential consideration," p. 15), Senator Moynihan sees the MX as
a major destabilizing factor in US-Soviet relations. His reason for
this judgment is that if the Soviet Union had followed the United
States' example and had deployed forces for the purpose of
deterrence, then there would be little or no problem. But, he points
out, this is not the pattern of US-Soviet relations. He writes (p. 15):
But they [i.e. the Soviet Union] [have] not deployed their forces
in a deterrent mode, as we [have] done. The size and number of
their missiles could only imply a first-strike mode. This is to say,
they are right out there in plain view, essentially undefended. They
are highly, if not wholly, vulnerable to a first strike from the United
States, but so long as the United States did not have a weapon
capable of such a mission, the Soviet could, if they chose, keep calm.
And they did. They kept on building, but not in a fit of panic.

The destabilizing effect on the MX system is that, while their
utility is to mount a first strike capability, they are themselves
vulnerable to destruction by a Soviet first strike. He tells us that
"the phrase is 'use 'em or lose 'em."' (p. 19) But, does this perception include continuing effectiveness, for the purpose of deterrence,
of the other two supports of the United States' defense "triad" the nuclear bombers (the "improved B-52's") and the new Trident
submarines with their new D-5 missiles? Would not these, if the
MX missiles were taken out, continue to assure a second strike
capability?
But at the heart of the issue it would appear that Senator
Moynihan, like the Roman Catholic Bishops in their 1983 Pastoral
Letter on War and Peace, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise
and Our Response, tends to share Cardinal Krol' s moral perception
that while deterrence "may in fact have prevented nuclear war-
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fare ... the risk of failure and the physical harm and moral evil
resulting from possible nuclear war remain[s]" (p. 14). He sees the
Cardinal's 1979 testimony as being echoed in the 1983 Pastoral
Letter's stress on "Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence
and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race
be reversed" (p. 14). This, at least, would appear to be the Senator's
moral position, while his political position appears as a strictly conditional acceptance of nuclear deterrence based only on prudential
grounds
But surely this is true of us all? Do we not, all of us, reject
nuclear deterrence as a categorical moral value? No one can argue
for the Truth, Beauty or Goodness of any nuclear missile- be it
the Hiroshima bomb, the SS-18 or the MX. In our world today
deterrence is an insurance: like all insurance it is merely a cost
incurred through nothing more than prudential considerations. Why
should anyone, otherwise, part with the dollars which go to pay
the premiums? But, perhaps, at the heart of the difficulty is the
fact that deterrence is only term insurance: it builds no equity.
In this chapter, too, Senator Moynihan takes issue with the
Pentagon's proposal to develop and deploy laser-beam satellites
designed to destroy Soviet missiles "at the booster stage," i.e., after
launching (p. 30). He sees this as an imprudent and impractical
"escape from reality; the mentality of the video arcade" (p. 30). He
takes the view that "there is only the remotest chance that even
one of the satellites woq.ld work," (p. 31) but, at the same time, he
asks us to "[c]onsider the heavens churning in nuclear inferno, while
all those little dials and digital devices go blithely about their doomsday detail" (p. 31). 1 While he is thus skeptical of the effectiveness
of the proposed satellites, he asserts that the "Soviet military will
believe that we will be able to bring it off' (p. 31), and envisages a
desperate Soviet first strike to pre-empt the satellites from being
deployed. This reviewer wonders whether the Soviet military would
be oblivious of the other two legs of the United States' triad. Be

1. The Economist, in a recent article Getting da out of nyet, THE ECONOMIST 13 (July
7, 1984), writes:
The "Star Wars" program of anti-missile defences, which Mr. Reagan claimed
last year would free the world from the threat of nuclear attack, is also under fire.
Congress is unhappy at the $26 billion down payment needed just to get research
under way, and worried because so many American scientists think the idea won't
work anyway. Even the President's men are divided about the wisdom of a space
race with the Russians.
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that as it may, Senator Moynihan calls for a "commitment to a
guarded reasonableness, to that spirit which is never too sure [that]
it is right" (p. 31).

II. RACISM AND ZIONISM
As the Senior Senator for New York, Senator Moynihan has
a special interest in the State of Israel and in supporting its special
relationship with the United States. But long before he stood for
election to the Upper House of the Congress, and when he was the
Head of the Permanent Mission of the United States to the United
Nations, he strongly championed the cause of that intrepid little
country. It is of great interest, therefore, to follow him as he traces
the history of a growing campaign of hate expressed with increasing
venom in a series of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions,
beginning November 19, 1975. The formula, reiterated like the
political chorus of George Orwell's sheep, "Zionism is a form of
racism and racial discrimination" (p. 36) or its equivalent, blare with
the banality and venom of its originators. Senator Moynihan finds
this verbal pogrom to have its beginning in the theoretical dilemmas of Russian Communism. Marxist ideology asseverates that the
roots of all human relations and beliefs grow exclusively in a
materialist soil. The means of production and the division of labor
which evolve for the utilization of those inanimate instruments of
production and for the distribution of the goods and services they
put into society condition all other relations, ideas, beliefs and
human perceptions. Religious, aesthetic and national beliefs and
attachments, like family relations and affections themselves, are
viewed as epiphenomena playing on the surface of the economic
process. They have no reality independent of the socio-economic
structures for which they are at once the excuse and the justification. They are seen simply as rationalizing or excusing distortions
and contradictions in the economic systems wherein they are found.
For example, chivalry (as noblesse oblige) is perceived as one of the
excuses for the feudal system's distorted allocations of resources,
commodities and command power in favor of the knightly class.
Similarly, in pre-classical Rome, the power of the hearth-gods
justified the power of the father which, in turn, was the needed
system for managing the inherited farms through generation after
generation.
The author argues that the persistence of ethnic identities
testifies to the inadequacy of the Marxist theory. Religious and
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national beliefs thus constitute the greatest threat to the internal
unity of the Soviet Union and its hegemony over its empire. He
points out that kinfolk of the Jews within Russia have created a
nation state of their own outside the reach of the Soviet Union.
Israel is an ideological rallying point and is a source of the continuing
renewal of the religious and national identity of the J·ews within
the Soviet Union and its empire just as much as outside its borders.
Soviet authorities thus perceive Israel as reinforcing the threat to
internal unity-a threat created by bonds which do not wither away
as epiphenomena should. Secondly, the State of Israel is perceived
as a bastion of Western influence in an area into which the Soviet
Union is anxious to expand. Hence, Senator Moynihan perceives
that, in addition to the survival of primitive anti-Semitism which
may still influence Soviet attitudes toward Israel (which he wishes
neither to exaggerate nor discount), there are foreign policy and
ideological motives for current Soviet anti-Israeli charges.
After the Six-Day War Moscow saw Zionism amongst its own
Jewish population as a serious problem and as comparable with
other nationalist movements which had provoked the Tsars and
their Soviet successors to suppress and replace Zionism with more
conformist attitudes beliefs and commitments. At that time the
authorities orthodoxly dismissed Zionism as a link between
American imperialism and the Israeli bourgeoisie. As the Senator
said, "this required no ideologicai innovation" (p. 38). But the Soviet
propaganda machine did not rest there, but evolved a whole new
ideological attack.
Moynihan credits the roots of this new departure to a two-part
article in the February 18-19, 1971 issues of Pravda which was
"promptly" published as an English language pamphlet by Novosti
Press Agency of Moscow (p. 40). He then credits Viktorovich
Bolshakov, Deputy Secretary of Pravda's editorial board in charge
of the paper's international department, with the authorship of the
article. In it Bolshakov alleged that Zionists collaborated with the
Nazis, kept order in Jewish ghettos and provided overseers for the
death camps. Indeed, he alleged that the tragedy of Babi-Yar "will
forever be a reminder not only of the monstrous barbarity of the
Nazis but also of the indelible disgrace of their accomplices and
followers-the Zionists" (p. 41).
This, the author tells us, was the background of the General
Assembly's November 1975 Zionist resolution. As United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, Moynihan set up a spirited
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resistance. It was unavailing. Because he believed that the Soviet
Union and the Arab states had overreached, he felt that their ability
to command their usual majorities had been impaired. He states
(p. 42):
The time was at hand for the United States, and the West,
to make clear that we would be loyal to those who stood with us.
There needed to be rewards and punishments, both concrete and
avowed. The new nations in particular were learning their way
in a new world and needed to have it made clear that there are
matters the United States took with profound seriousness-even
if other nations do not.

The United States did not act as Moynihan advocated. He now
sees, as he saw then, the Zionism resolution as being an opportunity for the Soviets to seize an initiative and condemn Israel in all
the available organs of the United Nations by arraigning the leaders
of Israel with the crimes for which the Nazi leadership had been
punished at Nuremburg. Under the Ford administration the official
United States policy in the General Assembly and the other political
organs of the United Nations had been "damage control" (p. 44).
With the Carter administration a new direction was invoked- "commitment" (p. 44). Basically this policy's premise was that the
majority of the General Assembly "must be right-or at least
partially right" (p. 44).
As a result of this new Carter direction, the United States
voted on March l, 1980 in favor of a Security Council Resolution
condemning Israel for the '"flagrant violation' of the Fourth Geneva
Convention" -in fact a charge of genocide (p. 45). The United States
refused to disavow this vote. It brought a nemesis to one whose
fatal flaw was an impenetrable naivete. Later, searching for
scapegoats, President Carter blamed this vote for his losing New
York, a key state, in the 1980 Presidential election. But the author
sees in that vote, in the General Assembly, "the essential Carter"
(p. 57).
In this triumph of Balshakov, furthermore, and the history
behind it, Moynihan perceives the outlines of a sustained, worldwide ideological struggle with the "forces of liberalism" under
incessant attack- "an attack that the West somehow avoids
knowing about" (p. 57). He sees the present phase of this attack
as consisting almost exclusively of a vilification of Zionism and
Israel. As this program of vilification continues, the world should
remember that Israel is the only democratic state in the Middle
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East enjoying a multiplicity of political parties, free elections and
an open society. Focussing on these issues, Moynihan focuses on
a perceived lack of loyalties to the country, to a belief in freedom
and to the traditions of liberalism. If the hostile campaign continues,
will that loyalty be found?

III. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reviewing the United States' reaction, under the two most
recent Administrations, to breaches of international law by the
Soviet Union and other countries - for example the invasion of
Afghanistan, the seizure of the United States Embassy in Teheran
and the forwarding of Soviet imperialist designs during the Carter
Administration, and, more recently, during Reagan's presidency,
the shooting down by Soviet i~terceptor aircraft of KAL-007 with
the deaths of all on board, including sixty-one American citizens,
and the Cuban/Soviet build-up on Grenada- Senator Moynihan sees
a dangerous and misdirected trend in perceptions and policy. By
reacting with bewildered and angry injury he commented that the
Carter administration turned "out looking like the third act of Rain2
with no sense of principle left intact" (p. 62). This was clearly
illustrated in Carter's reaction to the Iranian seizure of the United
States' embassy in Teheran, namely his aborted helicopter raid
which, predictably, ended the United States' hopes for vindication
through a unanimously favorable judgment of the International
Court of Justice. It may be seen, indeed, as a paradigm example
of the theme of Rain, of becoming one's adversary. The religiously
inspired President fell to the level of the Soviet use and misuse
of force; like the equally sincere missionary he became the target
of the Soviet Judge's (Judge Morozov's) mockery and scorn as,
indeed, his doppelganger in Rain became the target of the
prostitute's contempt. Moynihan sees the Reagan administration
as following down the same primrose path. He offers two examples:
The Falklands Islands fight and the Grenada Mission.
Senator Moynihan reports that he urged, on the Senate floor,
that Britain take its case against Argentina to the International
Court of Justice. He also claims that this "argument had enough
force for The Times of London to report it." He argued that the
2. Rain was a Somerset Maugham story, turned into a play and a movie, in which
a missionary, seeking to bring a prostitute to Christ, finishes up having sexual relations
with her, thereby engaging her mocking contempt. Inevitably, he was driven to suicide.
The prostitute, reinforced in her skepticism, returns to her sailor clients.
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Court would rule the Argentinian conduct illegal. This would have
been the result, he believed, that if "the United States then chose
to support the British, we would be free to do so under the color
of the Court's orders" (p. 92). With all respect to the Senator, one
must disagree with his evaluation of the Falklands case. His premise
is that it was identical with the Hostages case. In this later crisis
situation the United States needed the Court's judgment because
it, by reason of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, was unable
to obtain a validation of its position from that central, key institution of the United Nations. The Soviet veto, in fact, forced the
United States to seek the Court's endorsement of her position. By
contrast, Britain had the Security Council Resolution it needed. Furthermore, once the Security Council had rendered its Resolution,
it is highly probable that the Court would find a British application to be, in effect, redundant. A close analogy to the Falkland issue
was the Court's rejection, in 1976, of the Greek application to it
for interim measures in that country's dispute with Turkey
regarding rights to submarine areas of the Aegean Sea. The fact
that the dispute had been the subject of a Resolution of the Security
Council induced the Court to refuse Greece's application. 3 Clearly
3. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, (Greece v. Turk.) (1976] I.C.J. 3 (Order of Sept.
11, 1976).
At page 12 the Court states:
37. Whereas the Court has cognizance of the fact that, simultaneously with the

proceedings before it in respect of the request for interim measures of protection,
the United Nations Security Council also has been seized of the dispute between
Greece and Turkey regarding the Aegean Sea continental shelf; whereas, on 10
August 1976 (the day on which the application and request for interim measures
were filed), the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations wrote
to the President of the Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council
in view of "recent repeated flagrant violations by Turkey of the sovereign rights
of Greece on its continental shelf in the Aegean"; and whereas the Security Council
discussed the question at meetings held on 12, 13 and 25 August 1976, with the
participation of the representatives of Greece and Turkey;
38. Whereas on 25 August 1976 the Security Council adopted by consensus a resolution (resolution 395 (1976)) by which, inter alia, the Security Council urged the
Governments of Greece and Turkey "to do everything in their power to reduce
the present tensions in the area so that the negotiating process may be facilitated,"
called on Greece and Turkey "to resume direct negotiations over their differences,"
and appealed to them to do "everything within their power to ensure that this
results in mutually acceptable solutions";
41. Whereas both Greece and Turkey, as Members of the United Nations, have
expressly recognized the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security; whereas, in the above-mentioned resolution,
the Security Council has recalled to them their obligations under the United Nations
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the Court would neither second-guess the Council, nor review a
matter of which the Council was concurrently seized, nor give a
pronunciation on an issue already resolved by the Security Council.
In the Falklands dispute, Britain had the support of a Security
Council Resolution denouncing the Argentinian invasion, requiring
Argentina to withdraw its forces from the islands and calling upon
both parties to settle their differences by negotiation. What then
could the Court do? Simply echo the Security Council? Experience
has shown that, when presented with effective action by the
Security Council, the Court will hold its hand. Of course, should
unmeritorious conduct occur subsequently to the Security Council
resolution, the Court will, in appropriate cases, exercise its lawfully conferred competences. It will, in such cases, resolve an adversarial dispute giving rise to its contentious jurisdiction. (To this
reviewer Senator Moynihan's proposal looks rather like a suggestion that Britain should have unilaterally applied to the Court for
advice and guidance on her legal rights and further lawful conduct;
but this is a jurisdiction with regard to states which its Statute,
perhaps erroneously, withholds from the Court, should states
mistakenly seek its advice).
With regard to the Court's jurisdiction, however, two further
points should be made with regard to the Falklands crisis. First,
Argentina has never adhered to the Optional Clause of the Court's
Statute which confers compulsory jurisdiction on the Court, so the
Court could not summon Argentina at Britain's unilateral behest.
Second, Britain has, on a number of occasions since 1945, sought
agreement with Argentina to take to the International Court of
Justice the quarrels between the two countries concerning not only
the Falkland Islands and South Georgia, but also the South Sandwich Islands and the disputed sector of Antarctica to the south of
Argentina (including the Palmer Peninsula (Graham's Land)). It goes
without saying that Argentina has always refused to litigate these
Charter with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes, in the terms already
set out above; whereas, furthermore, as the Court has already stated, these obligations are clearly imperative in regard to their present dispute concerning the continental shelf....
Accordingly,
THE COURT

Finds by 12 votes to 1, that the circumstances, as they now present themselves
to the Court, are not such as to require the exercise of its power under Article
41 of the Statute .. . .
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differences. Furthermore, if Argentina's then-ruling military junta
had informally reversed itself and privately expressed a willingness
to go to the Court at the thirteenth hour, the British Government
might have justifiably suspected it of an invidious motive-to play
for time. Having rejected the Court's jurisdiction so often, for so
long, so consistently, so arrogantly and so condignly, a sudden reversal by Argentina, after its landing on the islands, might justifiably
have been suspected as being no more than a ruse de guerreArgentina could have sought to use time consumed for preparing
briefs and arguments for fortifying its positions, for reinforcing its
troops, for "digging-in" in the islands. Finally, in his presentation,
Senator Moynihan does agree that (p. 92):
The validity of the Argentine claim to the "Malvinas" has
nothing to do with the illegality of its action. Under the Charter,
Argentina has forbidden itself the use of force in settling such
disputes. The Charter forbids it, and Argentina of its own free will
submitted to that restraint. Britain was entirely in the right, and
free to take any action it wished.

As a signatory to the Charter the United States was equally
free to honor its contractual obligations arising from Britain's
stipulation in her lease of a base on the island of Ascension (which
became a key staging point of the British forces) to provide supplies,
fuel and military stores of all kinds when the British military had
a need to use the base for lawful purposes. Of course, if the British
had been guilty of aggression in seeking to remove the Argentinian
forces, the leases stipulation would have been inoperative as, at
least under the circumstances of the case, being contrary to the
peremtory norm (the jus cogens) of international law which
invalidates agreements to engage in, or support, acts of aggression.
But, in the Falklands Islands case, the Security Council did not find
Britain to be the aggressor. Accordingly, a refusal to honor that
agreement would, especially in the face of the flagrant illegality
of the Argentinian invasion, have rendered the United States
delinquent on the basis of its honoring a lawful international contractual obligation.
Professor John Norton Moore has written, in a very scholarly
study entitled Law and the Grenada Mission, 4 that in addition to
the mission's justification as a rescue of American citizens
4. J.

MOORE. LAW AND THE GRENADA MISSION
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threatened with the possibility of being taken hostage (a la the
Teheran Embassy debacle) or worse, the United States was justified
in so acting by virtue of Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations
Charter (collective self-defense with the Organization of the Eastern
Caribbean States) and Articles 22 and 28 of the Charter of the
Organization of American States.
There is a further argument supporting the Mission's
lawfulness which seems to have been overlooked by American
skeptics of the legality of the Grenada Mission, but who approve
of it as successful Realpolitik. That argument is squarely based on
the letter of October 24, 1983, 5 from Sir Paul Scoon, the GovernorGeneral to Grenada, to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States, invoking their help. Their are questions as to whether Sir
Paul had the constitutional authority to write such a letter, and
whether the other countries of the OECS, and, in addition, Jamaica
and the United States, were authorized, aside from the United Nations
Charter, the OAS Charter and the OECS Treaty of Establishment,
to respond positively to that appeal for help. International law has
long recognized the right of an incumbent government to seek help
from its friends to maintain domestic order as well as resist foreign
aggression. A foreign state is not (aside, possibly, from the justified
issues of humanitarian intervention, for example, for the validity
of which some publicists have contended) entitled to intervene at
the behest of an individual citizen of the target state. But, of course,
international law allows such an intervention if it is made at the
request of a lawfully constituted public authority with valid
domestic competence to issue such an invitation. The question,
accordingly, becomes one of whether Sir Paul had the constitutional
authority to write such a letter in his official capacity as GovernorGeneral, or whether his letter was no more than an ineffective cry
for help from a private citizen of Grenada.
In those independent sovereign states of the Commonwealth
in which the office of Governor-General (or Governor) has been
retained, that officer is not the representative of the British Government, but the personal representative of the Monarch as Queen of
the country concerned-i.e., Queen of Australia, Canada, Grenada
etc. The Governor-General does not represent her as the Queen of
the United Kingdom. Nor does he represent the British Govern5. This letter is, of course, a key document in the issue of illegality. It is reprinted
as Appendix I of MOORE, supra note 4, at 87.
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ment. Where, constitutionally, the monarchy remains and the
Westminster Model provides the blueprint of government, the
powers of the Executive Branch are exercised by a cabinet which
is both accountable to, and can command a majority in, the
Legislature. Hence the Monarch (or the Governor-General) has no
day-to-day power. Nor has she real power in times of stable party
politics - the leadership of one party, or of a coalition of parties,
will provide the individuals entitled to be called to form the government of the state. But when these preconditions of stability break
down, constitutional doctrine provides that the Monarch, or her
representative, may exercise the "reserve power of the Crown."
In an interesting article chiding Labor Party members of the British
Parliament, as well as some members of the Government Party,
for misperceiving Sir Paul Scoon's powers and obligations, The
Economist pointed out that, "Sir Paul is the only remaining link
with the constitutionality of a country that lost the rest of its constitutional framework in 1979, and last month ceased even to have
an internationally recognized government." 6
In addition to the powers of the Governor-General through his
commission and the common law, it should be pointed out that his
authority could be considered as continuing under Prime Minister
Bishop's "People's Laws" of 1979, especially under People's Law
No. 3. We may, further, refer to the Grenada constitution of 1973
which established the office of Governor-General. The relevant provisions are Articles 57, 61 and 69. The first of these, Article 57,
provides:
(1) The executive authority of Grenada is vested in Her Majesty.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive
authority of Grenada may be exercised on behalf of Her Majesty
by the Governor-General either-directly or through officers subordinate to him. 7

Then Article 61 provides:
[I]f the Governor-General, acting in his own deliberate judgment,
considers that it is impracticable to obtain the advice of the Prime
Minister owing to his absence or illness he may exercise those
powers [emergency appointment powers of the Prime Minister
function] in his own deliberate judgment. 8
6. See Grenada: More Light on It, THE ECONOMIST 42 (Nov. 5, 1983).
7. Constitution of Grenada, reprinted in MOORE, supra note 4, at 52-54.
8. Id.
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Finally, Article 69 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law,
the Governor-General may constitute offices for Grenada, make
appointments to any such office and terminate any such
appointment. 9

Whether or not Sir Paul Scoon acted under these and other
relevant articles, while his commission remained in force and while
the monarchy was not abolished, the inherent, common law and
customary constitutional law powers of his office ensured the
validity of his authority to act for the common good of his country
in the emergency which actually supervened.
This reviewer would also like to add a further comment he
made in a letter he sent to the New York Times (which was not
published by that august publication) on the issue of the legality
of the Grenada Mission. After stressing the constitutional common
law of many Commonwealth polities such as Grenada, he pointed
out that there is a great unenlightment, in the United States, of
Commonwealth matters. Had there been the needful light, the
difficulty experienced here of grasping the role of Sir Paul Scoon,
his competence, and indeed his duty, to send the crucial appeal for
help, and the consequential legality of the action by the United
States, Jamaica and the States of the OECS would not have occured.
There would not have been the misinformation which was found
on all sides. Had needful enlightment existed, the regrettable sentiments quoted (in a mood of criticism and displeasure) by the
Senator from one of the most influential newspapers in the United
States would not have been published in even the most parochial
and bucolic newspapers in the nation. Senator Moynihan writes,
"A Wall Street Journal editorial at this time began by recounting
a dinner table conversation in which a guest declared, 'We are only going to be able to talk sensibly about Grenada if anyone here
who is an international lawyer agrees to keep his mouth shut."'
The benighted utterance by the dinner (not the wedding) guest
would have been obviated, this reviewer believes, especially among
the sophisticated circles which provide the Wall Street Journal with
its readership and its newsmakers, if the Department of State were
to overcome an ancient prejudice and install a Commonwealth desk
in its hierarchy. This increasingly essential piece of Foggy Bottom
furniture has never existed, nor has an officer ever been required
9. Id.

Published by SURFACE, 1984

13

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1984], Art. 9

Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Com.

184

[Vol. 11:171

to gain the necessary proficiency to man it. As a result, no Department of State spokesman was equipped to explain the issue of
legality in terms of Sir Paul Scoon's essential role.
Around the world today there are many Grenadas, not only
in the Caribbean, but also in every ocean of the globe. In many of
them anarchy may, one day, supervene. Will there again be the same
discordant and uninformed outcries claiming unlawful conduct if
the United States were to intervene at the behest of another
beleaguered Sir Paul Scoon? Clearly, a field of knowledge of the
morality of lawful behavior is awaiting the plough of insight and
clarity of thought.

IV. LAW AND MORALITY
This book's most important contribution, so this reviewer
believes, has nothing to do with specific legal points which, in comparison with its main thrust, become relatively unimportant. It is
Senator Moynihan's passionate commitment to the basic value of
obedience to law. This is not itself a legal matter, but one of
morality. Long respected and adhered to in America, the moral commitment to international legality is an essential cement for the
international community, and one which exchanges anarchy for
common action, and Realpolitik for peace. In general, obedience to
law is an independent moral value. It takes effect independently
of an individual's concrete values such as commitments to the
institution of marriage, family, social protection from many of life's
handicaps or misfortunes, equal rights or any other projection of
society's choices into legislation. For obedience to law may call upon
the individual to comply with rules with which he strongly
disagrees. While many people, from Emerson to the present, have
engaged in civil disobedience and have refused, conscientiously, to
obey a law they morally reject, they have, equally conscientiously,
accepted their lawful punishment as a necessary result of their
disobedience. But Senator Moynihan's vignette from the Wall Street
Journal does not reflect such a conscientious refusal such as
Emerson's; rather, it is a sentiment that international law does not
operate constructively to further world community interests, but
simply reflects a restraint on the United States' freedom to further her interests in the world arena. Such a view sees a
Machiavellian advantage in disregarding law. This is not civil disobedience, but straightforward lawlessness. Senator Moynihan calls the
United States to her traditional values of identify;ing her global
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interests with international law and her long-established morality
of obedience to law. This is not only a categorical value but also
a prudential one. Obedience to law induces rational behavior and
enlightened self-interest as well as the base values of peace and
cooperation. In his final statement of loyalty to rationality and
legality Senator Moynihan's book makes an important contribution
to current ideas. And this reviewer hopes he will be persuasive in
the Senate of the United States of the prudential merit of the
proposition that the values of legality are more constructive, and
more in the country's interest, than those of Machiavelli, the Medicis
and the Borgias. The anarchic politics of self-interest which those
men pursued, despite their hopes and indeed their visions, led to
the abasement of Italy 10 and the passing of greatness to other countries which emerged as the leaders of civilization through the
binding of their diverse communities into their national legal
systems through their acceptance of the moral imperative of
obedience to law and the performance of legal duties.

L.F.E. Goldie
10. In her important new book, THE MARCH OF FOLLY, Barbara Tuchman writes of the
six Renaissance Popes (including two Medicis and two Borgias) as, through their follies giving
rise to the schism of Christendom and the inevitable triumph of Protestantism. B. TUCKMAN,
THE MARCH OF FOLLY (1984). But our retrospective appraisal may be anachronistic. Those Popes
were elected, not for their foolishness any more than for their holiness, but for their political
acuity. In terms of the value system of the time, they were men of respect. Their parallel
in England, namely Richard III, for example has passed into the opproprium of history despite
his bravery as a soldier, the thoroughness of his political logic and his contempt for the
restraints of morality. Sir Thomas More in his counterblast to Machiavelli's Il Principe,
summed up the delusion and limitation of purely political solutions when he wrote of
"England's 'Black Legend"': "Where he went abroad, his eyes whirled about, his body secretly
armoured, his hand ever on his dagger." T. MOORE, THE HISTORY OF KING RICHARD THE THIRD.
reprinted in 2 COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE (R. Sylvester ed. 1963).
Fortunately for England (and Britain) the healing through obedience to law came with
the Tudors. More generally, the issue was not one of the "march of folly" but of the lack
of principle and the loss of morality.
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CULTURES IN COLLISION-A CANADIAN-U.S. CONFERENCE
ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY. Foreward by Goodwin
Cooke. New York: Praeger, 1984. Pp. v, 197.

CULTURES IN COLLISION represents the collected works of the
Canadian-U.S. Conference on Communications Policy which was held
in New York in March, 1983. Although the book does not attempt
to resolve the complicated disagreements between Canada and the
United States over broadcast policy issues, it does present a solid
base of policy alternatives from which future negotiations can
evolve. Given the current standstill in Canadian-U.S. negotiations
over broadcast policy harmonization, this is indeed no minor
accomplishment.
The policy dispute in question stems from not only the profound legal and historical differences between Canada and the
United States, but from current and projected differences in the
two countries' approaches to communications policy (p. ix). Indeed,
as Ambassador Goodwin Cooke points out, "[t]he innumerable
similarities between the two nations often conceal these differences
... (p. ix). Resolution, or containment of the broadcast dispute,
[therefore,] will require mutual appreciation of the differences in
communications law, practice and policy" (p. x).
CULTURES IN COLLISION is a useful introduction that will enable
the reader to appreciate the difference inherent in this complex
debate. The book addresses four principle areas: an historic comparison of Canadian and American approaches to broadcast policy
(Frank W. Peers, p. 11-34); sovereignty and television (Mark J.
Freiman, p. 104-21); the impact of new technologies on CanadianU.S. broadcast relations (Thomas H. Martin, p. 181-97); and the
border-broadcasting dispute itself (Theodore Hagelin and Hudson
Janisch, p. 40-99). The book also includes distinguished submissions
by the Honorable Allan E. Gotlieb, John Meisel, Stephen Sharp,
Leslie G. Arries, Jr. and Yale Braunstein. Each author's contribution is uniquely and equally valuable to the understanding of the
broad range of issues addressed.
I.

After a brief foreward concerning Canadian and U.S. communications policies and the impact of new technologies in general
(written by Ambassador Goodwin Cooke), Canadian Ambassador
187
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/9

16

et al.: Book Reviews

188

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 11:187

Allan Gotlieb addresses "Culture and Communications in the 1980s"
(p. 1). Gotlieb's remarks strongly indicate that Canada has opted
for a new broadcast strategy for the '80s. This new strategy includes such policies as a dedication to the "expression of programming choice" and the "strengthening of Canadian programming"
(p. 8). These new directions, however, are contingent in the former
case upon the success of future international agreements and in
the latter case upon the availability of larger amounts of public
funding.
Canada's new strategy is also marked by an openness toward
the United States which will hopefully promote greater bilateral
discussion of communications issues. As Ambassador Gotlieb appropriately remarks, "[a]t a time when many nations are erecting
new barriers to trade, Canada is turning toward greater openness"
(p. 9). Given recent breakthroughs in Canadian-U .S. cooperation on
the use of domestic satellites for transborder communications, this
new policy may indeed be quickly becoming a reality. Gotlieb concludes by emphasizing that Canada has entered a new era; one that
is "perhaps the most exciting" in the history of Canadian television broadcasting (p. 10).
Chapter two, written by Frank Peers, is a comparison of the
origins and historical perspectives of Canadian and U.S. broadcast
policies (p. 11). Peers explains the current divergence in the two
nations' policies by emphasizing the differing Canadian and U.S.
perspectives on the value and benefits of a free market distribution of broadcast resources. For Canada, Peers feels a growing
discomfort over the vigor with which free market forces are turning Canadian communications into a U.S. subsidiary operation. The
author explains that it is the need for Canadian sovereignty in the
development of future broadcast policies that has forced the Canadian Government to intervene on behalf of the communications
needs of all Canadians.
For the United States, Peers suggests that the free market
distribution of broadcast resources has never been "seriously questioned" (p. 29). He relies for this analysis on the alleged inability
of the U.S. government to appreciate the need for some level of
safeguarding for the sovereignty of Canadian broadcasting (p. 32).
While the author concludes that such safeguards are themselves
unadvisable, both because they are unlikely to work and because
of their implications for U.S. relations, the question remains how
Canada can avoid safeguard policies, especially in light of the
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author's strong belief in the need for a pervasive, sovereign government presence in the Canadian broadcast industry.
In chapter three, Theodore Hagelin and Hudson Janisch
examine the border broadcasting dispute. Their discussion is divided
into three parts. First, the development of the border broadcast
dispute between Canada and the United States is highlighted
chronologically (p. 42). Second, constraints on, and contradictions
within, U.S. and Canadian domestic communications policies are considered (p. 56). Third, a model for analysis of the border broadcasting
dispute based on a breakdown of the distinct concerns of the actors
within the industry is proposed (p. 74).
Hagelin and Janisch identify the exportation of U.S. network
programming by border broadcast station affiliates into Canadian
markets as the principal structural problem in the dispute (p. 87).
Two proposals are offered to deal with this problem. They are: (1)
that restrictions such as C-58 (the program which limits the ability
of Canadian advertisers to deduct from income taxes the expenses
of advertising on U.S. stations where the advertisements are
directed at a Canadian audience) not apply to programming produced by U.S. border broadcast stations; and (2) that the network
programming be distributed directly to Canada via satellite links
to cable system lead ends (p. 88).
Although these proposals do not embrace the interests of all
affected parties, they provide a solid point of departure for further
discussion. More importantly, especially in the case of the latter,
they . incorporate newly evolving technologies into the on-going
negotiating process. This type of problem solving clearly belongs
at the forefront of the viable policy alternatives. Such suggestions
encompass the means of both resolving the current deadlock, and
easing the pressures for non-resolution inherent in the fears of
unknown technologies.
In chapter four, Mark Freiman addresses "Consumer and National Sovereignty in Domestic and International Broadcasting
Regulation" (p. 104). According to Freiman, who stresses the need
for Canadian communications policy to "produce programming at
all cultural levels" (p. 117), the path to resolving Canadian policy
conflicts is not through the elevation of consumer sovereignty.
Rather, as an alternative to deregulation or a general free market
approach, Freiman postulates that the most likely and most practical method of achieving programming at all cultural levels is
through the use of generally funded independent public national
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broadcasting systems (p. 117). In short, Freiman takes the arguably
controversial position that government regulation of broadcasting
is more in line with viewers' true interests than individual consumer
choice through the market place.
In a critique following the Freiman discussion, Glen Robinson
offers support for the elevation of public broadcasting, but then
criticizes Freiman for not being faithful to his own principles by
balancing the interests of national sovereignty against consumer
sovereignty (p. 127). Robinson argues that if Canadian cultural
sovereignty and the erosion thereof through U.S. programming
dominance is really at issue, then the establishment of a board of
censors is perhaps advisable (p. 127). Such a board would screen
foreign-made programs carried on Canadian broadcast stations and
cable systems. While Robinson expresses discomfort with a scheme
which promotes censorship, he clearly also finds those discomforts
outweighed by the projected gains for Canadian cultural preservation (p. 128).
In chapter five, John Meisel and Stephen Sharp address broadcast regulation in Canada. Working from an historical perspective,
Meisel contrasts the Canadian need for regulation with the
American need for deregulation. Meisel maintains that government
presence in Canadian broadcasting is not only a current public mandate, but one which has deep historical roots. This being contrary
to the history and demonstrated needs of American broadcasting,
there must and always will be fundamental differences in Canadian
and U.S. approaches to the goals and methods of broadcast
regulation.
Chapter six, by Leslie G. Arries, Jr., presents valuable insight
into the position of border broadcasters. As a U.S. broadcaster who
has participated extensively in the effort to resolve the lingering
policy dispute, his presentation shows a clear appreciation for the
cultural issues which underlie current Canadian policies. Even given
this level of understanding,. however, Arries does not sympathize
with Canadian interests to the extent of such "unfair and one-sided"
policies as Bill C-58 (p. 149). Arries postulates that such legislation
is not only bad for U.S.-Canadian relations, but is not effective at
promoting the very goal for which it was developed, namely, the
promotion of indigenous Canadian programming. As an alternative,
Arries urges the Canadian Government to use sources of funds such
as cable systems profits to support and foster the Canadian program production industry (p. 149).
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In chapter seven, Yale Braunstein examines the economics of
advertiser-supported television in Canada and the United States
(p. 152). Braunstein suggests that neither program funding, nor production, will be affected by Canadian policies aimed at the advertising medium (p. 158). Rather, those programs both proposed, and
currently in effect, operate most significantly as a means of actually
diverting income from U.S. broadcasters to Canadian stations. The
real irony of the situation, however, is that according to Braunstein's
econometric analysis, there is no evidence of any significant negative
impact on the revenues of the Canadian stations the current policies
are principally aimed a:t affecting. Braunstein concludes, therefore,
that the major problem is the propensity of Canadian television
viewers to watch U.S. programming, not the propensity of Canadian television broadcasters to seek access to the Canadian market
through U.S. station affiliates (p. 159).
Finally, in chapter eight, Thomas Martin analyzes the impact
of "New Techniques and Future Technologies on Canadian-U.S.
Broadcast Relations" (p. 181). After a careful examination of various
scenarios designed to illustrate possible future sources of conflict
inherent in the current drive toward advanced communications
technologies, Martin is both practical and open in concluding that
while the free market evolution of advanced technology may be
legitimate, "there is no guarantee that wide-open competition and
entrepreneurial spirit will lead to happiness" (p. 197). For that
reason, as well as the recognition that government has a clear role
to play in communications technology development, Martin prefers
to see future technology breakthroughs preceded by bilateral
agreements governing the international exploitation of new systems.

II.

CULTURES IN COLLISION is a book with a title that expresses
most appropriately the sentiments of those familiar with the
Canadian-U.S. communications policy debate. It is not only a collision which affects one of the largest and fastest growing U.S. export service industries, but one that touches the basic social and
moral fiber of our two societies and the forms of government we
have elected to represent those views.
Whether the evolution of Canadian and U.S. policies will
achieve an effective assimilation of the competing forces addressed
in this book, however, is not the immediate concern. Rather, of
highest priority, and for which this book speaks most loudly, is the
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need for a detailed and comprehensive look at what possible solutions exist within the realm of the realizable alternatives.
-Ed.
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